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Startingwith thework of Cajal more than 100 years ago, neuroscience has sought to understand how the cells
of the brain give rise to cognitive functions. How far has neuroscience progressed in this endeavor? This
Perspective assesses progress in elucidating five basic brain processes: visual recognition, long-termmem-
ory, short-termmemory, action selection, andmotor control. Each of these processes entails several levels of
analysis: the behavioral properties, the underlying computational algorithm, and the cellular/network mech-
anisms that implement that algorithm. At this juncture, while many questions remain unanswered, achieve-
ments in several areas of research have made it possible to relate specific properties of brain networks to
cognitive functions. What has been learned reveals, at least in rough outline, how cognitive processes can
be an emergent property of neurons and their connections.The human brain, with its 80 billion neurons, is one of the most
complex systems on Earth. The field of neuroscience has striven
to elucidate brain function for more than 100 years. My objective
in this Perspective is to offer an overview of how far neuroscience
has progressed in the endeavor to understand the brain.
At the outset, it is important to define what ‘‘understanding’’
the brain entails. Information about the brain has been obtained
by many approaches, ranging from the cellular to the cognitive,
and this information must be integrated. A useful framework for
such integration was developed by David Marr, whose work
in the 1970s pioneered efforts to understand specific brain
networks (Marr, 2010). Marr argued that understanding a brain
process requires efforts at three levels. First, the functional prop-
erties of the process must be defined and behaviorally charac-
terized. Next, the computational algorithm that performs that
process must be identified. Finally, how neurons and their
network connections lead to the execution of that algorithm
must be determined.
Although the subject of thisPerspective is the understanding of
the vertebrate brain, consideration of a simple network found in
the eye of an invertebrate, the horseshoe crab, provides a helpful
vehicle to illustrate how a brain process can be understood using
Marr’s framework. The horseshoe crab eye has an array of
cellular units, each of which is excited by the light that impinges
on it (reviewed in Ratliff, 1972). It was found that this array pro-
cesses the image in a way that enhances regions of contrast
(Marr’s first level). This was shown by the fact that excitation of
an illuminated cell was enhanced if nearby cells were kept in
the dark, thereby generating contrast. Further analysis indicated
that this interaction could be accounted for by a simple algorithm
in which excited cells reduced the response of nearby cells
(Marr’s second level). To achieve Marr’s third level, physiological
and anatomical experiments on the network connections in the
eye showed that cells reduce the response in nearby cells as a
result of monosynaptic inhibitory connections, a network archi-
tecture called ‘‘lateral inhibition’’ (Figure 1A; for another example
of an ‘‘understood’’ process in invertebrates, see Figure 1B).864 Neuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Before proceeding with a discussion of the vertebrate brain,
three prefatory comments about the scope and organization of
this Perspective are in order. First, due to space limitations, I
have selected for review only a subset of the important brain
functions; namely, visual recognition, memory (short-term and
long-term), action selection, andmotor control. These processes
together are, in principle, sufficient to account for a simple visu-
ally evoked behavior (e.g., a rat conditioned to make a right turn
in response to a particular visual stimulus). In this Perspective, I
will begin with vision and end with motor control because this or-
der conveys a sense of the flow of events in the brain that under-
lies a simple behavior. Second, Marr’s third level involves a
description of how neuronal signals (i.e., action potentials and
excitatory/inhibitory synaptic potentials) are generated, as well
as how they propagate through a network. Although much prog-
ress has been made in understanding signal generation, I will
focus almost exclusively on network processes, again solely
due to space limitations. Finally, in assessing our understanding
of a brain function, it is important to discuss not only what is
known but also what is not known. For this reason, I begin
each section with a functional description of a process (Marr’s
first level). This sets the stage for assessment of the extent to
which neuroscience has achieved a satisfactory explanation of
this process at Marr’s second and third levels.
Marr’s predicate—and, indeed, that of all modern neurosci-
ence—is that cognitively important functions can be explained
as an emergent property of neurons and their network connec-
tions. When Marr started his exploration, there were virtually
no experimental data directly linking the network and cognitive
levels. Over the ensuing decades, the situation has dramatically
changed. The firing properties of neurons have been measured
during many types of behavioral tasks. Advances in computa-
tional neuroscience have provided insight into how the particular
architecture of a network (the pattern of excitatory and inhibitory
connections) can lead to particular computations and observed
firing patterns. More recently, the development of optogenetics
(reviewed in Fenno et al., 2011) has made it possible to mimic
Figure 1. Examples of Simple Neural
Networks that Perform Useful
Computations
(A) Lateral inhibition in the horseshoe crab eye.
(Top) If only the middle cell is illuminated (yellow
arrow), it fires strongly. (Bottom) If all cells are
illuminated, the middle cell fires less because it
receives inhibition from neighbors. The network
thus produces contrast detection (Ratliff, 1972).
(B) A half-center oscillator that mediates rhythmic
and alternating (e.g., walking) behaviors in in-
vertebrates. A simplified diagram with only two
cells. Each cell has intrinsic slowconductances that
produce spontaneous bursts of action potentials.
Because these cells mutually inhibit each other, the
cells burst in alternation (Sharp et al., 1996).
(C) Autoassociative memory. Pyramidal cells in
such networks have axons that make excitatory
(recurrent) connections with other cells in the
network. In the example discussed in the text, an
associative memory occurs by the strengthening
of the synapses that link cells 1 and 4 (dark blue).
Inhibitory cells are not shown (McNaughton and
Morris, 1987).
(D) Bump integrator. Each pyramidal cell excites nearby cells and inhibits more distant ones (only one set of connections shown). The excitation of nearby cells
leads to a region of high activity (a ‘‘bump’’). Without external inputs, the bump has a relatively stable position. External input activates asymmetrical connections
(not shown) that move the bump along the length of the network. Because the distance moved is proportional to external input, this network is capable of
integration (Zhang, 1996). For use of such bumps during decisions, see Wang (2012).
(E) Cumulative integrator. All cells receive the same external input pulse (not shown), but only cell 1 is initially bistable (e.g., able to produce persistent activity in
response to a brief excitatory input). After the first such input, the persistent activity in cell 1 is communicated to cell 2 by lateral connections, making cell 2
bistable (by activating its NMDA conductance); therefore, cell 2 can become persistently active when excited by a second input pulse. Integration occurs
because the more input pulses there are, the larger the number of persistently active cells there are (Koulakov et al., 2002). See Fisher et al. (2013) and Joshua
and Lisberger (2014) for how integration may occur in the oculomotor system.
(F) Winner-take-all by gamma oscillations. Pyramidal cells excite an interneuron network (only one interneuron is shown), which then provides global feedback
inhibition to pyramidal cells. As inhibition declines, the most excited cells will fire (the winners) and again produce feedback inhibition (de Almeida et al., 2009).
This repeating inhibition generates gamma frequency oscillations of the network. Other functions of gamma are binding the different cells that represent an item
into an ensemble (Engel and Singer, 2001) and formatting multi-item messages by creating a firing pause between different items (Figure 3C) (Lisman and
Jensen, 2013).
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eses. Together, these methods have yielded a great deal of data
and have led to data-driven models of how specific networks
perform cognitively relevant functions. My hope is that this
Perspective will convey an appreciation of this progress while,
at the same time, indicating where major gaps in our knowledge
remain.
Visual Recognition
Let us begin with a discussion of visual recognition, the most
extensively studied sensory process. The visual system is fast,
producing recognition in less than 200 ms (VanRullen and
Thorpe, 2001). This is quite remarkable, given the complexity
of the task. It is sometimes said that we never see the same thing
twice; an object may be in a different position, may have a
different size (because its distance from the viewer is different),
or may have a different rotation (the TV image of your retina is
rotated 90 when you watch while lying on your side). To achieve
recognition, the brain must somehow convert these varying im-
ages into a single invariant form that can then be compared to
a stored pattern. A further remarkable and counterintuitive
aspect of recognition is that visual scenes are not processed
as a whole. Instead, a movable window of attention serially sam-
ples different subregions. Indeed, if no attention is turned to an
object, the object is not perceived, even when in full view, a phe-
nomenon called ‘‘inattentional blindness’’ (Simons and Chabris,
1999). Some movements of attention can be due to changes inthe position of the eye but movement can also be produced
covertly while the eye is stable. Such covert movements of
attention can occur 30 times per second, as first established
psychophysically (Treisman and Gelade, 1980) and then physio-
logically (Buschman and Miller, 2009). Explaining recognition
thus requires elucidation of the mechanisms of attention and,
in particular, how serially sampled information is retained and
combined. Perhaps the most sophisticated aspect of recogni-
tion is its use of context. As illustrated in Figure 2, recognition
of a letter depends not just on its features but also on other letters
in the word and even other words in the sentence.
A starting point for anymodel of visual recognition is the exten-
sive literature on the response properties of cells in the verte-
brate visual system. The flow of visual information starts in the
retina and proceeds to the thalamus and, from there, to a hierar-
chy of cortical areas (Figure 3).The output cells of the retina
(ganglion cells) respond best to a small spot of light at a particular
position and less to global illumination (much like the cells of the
invertebrate eye discussed earlier). In contrast, cells in V1, the
first region of the cortical hierarchy, have a different representa-
tion: so-called ‘‘simple cells’’ respond best to a bar having a
particular orientation and position (Hubel and Wiesel, 1962). A
second set of cells, called ‘‘complex cells,’’ generalize the simple
cell response: they respond best to a bar of particular orientation
but, notably (discussed later), tolerate substantial variation in po-
sition. The output of V1 is processed (bottom-up) by a hierarchy
of intermediate and higher cortical areas (solid green areas inNeuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 865
Figure 2. Role of Context in Recognition
This figure demonstrates that the recognition of letters (H/B/A) is dependent
not only on the features of that letter but also on other letters in the word and
even other words in the sentence.
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parietal and temporal lobes (Felleman and Van Essen, 1991).
Recordings from high regions in this hierarchy (perirhinal and
entorhinal cortex and hippocampus; Figure 3) show that the
invariance problem is indeed solved by the time that signals
reach this level. There are cells in these regions that respond
to a particular face regardless of its size, position, and rotation
(Perrett et al., 1982; Quiroga et al., 2005). Thus, a key question
is the algorithm by which the output of V1 is processed by inter-
mediate regions of the hierarchy to achieve this invariance.
One proposed algorithm (Riesenhuber and Poggio, 2002)
posits that the operations of simple and complex cells of V1
are paradigmatic of operations that are repeated at various
stages of the visual hierarchy to produce a family of templates
that can be matched to incoming information. For instance, in
V4, an intermediate region in the hierarchy, a new representation
is developed in which cells represent shapes composed of
several linear segments. In this way, the feature conjunctions
(as in a partially unfolded paper clip) form a template to which
incoming information can subsequently be matched (Pasupathy
and Connor, 2002). This is generalized by a second set of V4
cells making the response less dependent on position (Cadieu
et al., 2007). Analogous operations at still-higher levels make it
possible for cells to become selective to yet more complex stim-
uli and categories and to do so with substantial invariance. The
Riesenhuber and Poggio (2002) algorithm accounts for many
physiological findings (but not rotation invariance) (for a review,
see DiCarlo et al., 2012).
An alternative to templates is an algorithm based on spatial
frequency, as in Fourier analysis (Cavanagh, 1985; Sountsov
et al., 2011). Three findings support this type of algorithm. (1)
Vision, as measured psychophysically, acts as if there are inde-
pendent pathways for gratings of different spatial frequencies
(Blakemore and Campbell, 1969). (2) V1 cells have spatial fre-
quency tuning (i.e., sensitivity to gratings of specific spatial fre-
quency). (3) Visual space is mapped over the entire V1 surface;
however, within subregions, there is a detailed map in which
the log of spatial frequency ismapped orthogonally to orientation
(Nauhaus et al., 2012). Simulations show that if such a mapping
procedure was reapplied to the V1 output, the resulting activity
map would be object specific and invariant to the object’s size,
position, and rotation (Sountsov et al., 2011), thus suggesting
how the brain might produce an analytical solution to the invari-866 Neuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.ance problem. Further experiments will be necessary to deter-
mine how invariance is actually achieved.
Other experiments have sought to determine whether there is
a particular brain region where recognition actually occurs. Fa-
miliarity (i.e., the feeling that you’ve seen somebody before
even though can’t remember when) can be measured in rodents
because, when placed near both a familiar object and a novel ob-
ject, rodents preferentially explore the novel one. Experiments
show that this preference depends on the perirhinal cortex, a
region in the medial temporal lobe (Figure 3A) (reviewed in Ei-
chenbaum et al., 2007). Cells in this region respond differentially
to familiar versus novel items, and recognition fails if this region is
disabled (Brown et al., 2010; Tang et al., 1997). A yet higher
structure, the hippocampus, is not required, as demonstrated
by the fact that the widely studied patient H.M. retained this abil-
ity after removal of his hippocampi (Corkin, 2013).
As noted earlier, recognition involves serial movements of
attention to different parts of an object. This implies that the cor-
tex must retain information about a sampled region while other
regions are processed. Insight into this and other aspects of vi-
sual recognition has been achieved by recordings from neurons
during recognition tasks (Desimone and Duncan, 1995; Hanes
and Schall, 1996; Shadlen and Newsome, 1996). Notably,
studies of cells in LIP, a parietal lobe region, showed that the
cortical network has integrator properties (Huk and Shadlen,
2005). Integrators provide a solution to the sampling problem
because they sustain their activity after input ceases (for a model
of how networks can integrate, see Figure 1E). The data indicate
that there are different integrators that represent different
possible items (Churchland et al., 2008) and that their firing
rate is proportional to the probability of that item (a probabilistic
population code) (Beck et al., 2008; Yang and Shadlen, 2007).
Consider now an integrator that represents the item being pre-
sented; as information accumulates, the firing rate increases
gradually—the moment of recognition occurs when a criterion
rate is achieved (for a review, see Shadlen and Kiani, 2013; see
also the section ‘‘Consciousness’’).
There has been progress in understanding the brain regions
that control attention and the role of brain oscillations in the pro-
cess (Baldauf and Desimone, 2014; Brooks et al., 2014; Busch-
man and Miller, 2009), but no clear mechanistic view of how the
attentional window is selected has emerged.
Let us now turn to the most sophisticated aspect of cortical
recognition: its dependence on context (Figure 2). The process
of reading the sentence in Figure 2 appears to involve two steps.
The first is the determination that the context could be baseball;
the second is the determination that, given this assumption, all of
the ambiguous letters can be interpreted in such a way that the
words are relevant to baseball. Such context-dependent inter-
pretation of letters is likely to depend on a fundamental architec-
tural design principle of the cortical hierarchy: that sequential
levels are not only connected from the bottom up but also from
the top down (reviewed in Gilbert and Li (2013). The top-down
connections are what may allow context to bias the interpreta-
tion of low-level features (Fenske et al., 2006; McClelland,
1986). In the example of Figure 2, the high-level cortex may
generate multiple hypotheses about the context, the most prob-
able of which is a baseball. Top-down connections could then
Figure 3. Cortical and Subcortical Brain
Regions
(A) Cytoarchitectonic areas (outlined in black) of
the macaque cortex have been identified by the
number of cell layers, their thickness, and cell
density. The cortical surface is viewed as a flat-
map. Such a map is necessary to see all of the
regions of the cortical surface, some of which are
normally hidden within folds. Different lobes are
outlined in different colors. The position of lobes is
indicated on the lateral and medial views of the
folded brain (bottom). Areas are grouped accord-
ing to the theory of dual origin of cerebral cortex
(Pandya and Yeterian, 1985): functional hierar-
chies occur in pairs (trends), one derived evolu-
tionarily from the hippocampus (archi; saturated
colors) and the other from the piriform cortex
(paleo; pastel colors). The dividing line between
the trends is marked by a white dashed line. The
paired trends are color coded according to the key
at the bottom right. The most recent additions to
each trend (neocortex) have six layers, whereas
the most primitive areas that form the origin of
trends (hippocampus and piriform cortex) have
three. In the visual system, the paleo trend (ventral)
is specialized for determining what is present; the
archi trend (dorsal) is specialized for determining
where objects are located. In the auditory system,
the paleo trend deals with sound identification
(what), the archi trend with sound localization
(where). In themotor and somatosensory systems,
the paleo trend preferentially deals with the face
and neck, and the archi trend deals with the trunk
and limbs (Kuypers, 1982). In the prefrontal sys-
tem, the paleo trend deals with emotions, and the
archi trend deals with executive control. The
dashed line is a thin layer of cells that connects
the ventral hippocampus to the dorsal parts of the
limbic system through a region not included in the
flatmap. The flatmap was adapted from Figure 1 of
Markov et al. (2014) by Dr. Deepak Pandya.
(B) Flow of information through major brain re-
gions. Uncolored shapes are subcortical regions.
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(predictive coding), thereby leading to context-dependent inter-
pretation of ambiguous letters.
Evidence that the brain actually generates predictions about
the features of incoming sensory items comes from the study
of mismatch negativity. This electroencephalogram (EEG) signal
is generated by the auditory cortex and occurs when an
incoming signal violates expectations based on the regularityNeuron(e.g., in tone or interval) of previous audi-
tory stimuli (Lieder et al., 2013). Another
example of prediction arises when brain
motor regions initiate an action; they
send a corollary discharge to sensory
regions predicting the sensory conse-
quences of one’s own upcoming action.
This allows these sensations to be mini-
mized (the EEG evoked potential is
smaller when you initiate the sound than
when you listen to the same sound in re-
corded form). Recent experiments indi-
cate that there are deficits of corollarydischarge in schizophrenia and that these deficits may produce
the loss of agency (sense of self) that occurs in this disease (Ford
et al., 2014; Shergill et al., 2014). For a review or predictive cod-
ing, see (Summerfield and de Lange, 2014).
Given the importance of bottom-up flow of sensory informa-
tion and the top-down flow of predictions, it is clear that the
still-mysterious algorithm of cortical computation will involve
bidirectional information flow. Theoretical work is beginning to86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 867
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accomplish. One study showed how such an algorithm can iden-
tify the most informative regions of an image (Feldman and Fris-
ton, 2010). Another study simulated bidirectional information
flow during recognition and successfully accounted for the
experimental finding that recognition time depends logarithmi-
cally on the number of contextually possible items (Graboi and
Lisman, 2003).
Considering these findings in the context of Marr’s framework,
it is clear that our understanding of the visual recognition process
is at a fairly early stage. There are now proposed algorithms
(Marr’s second level) for several aspects of vision, but much
further work is needed. Although a great deal is known about
the response properties of cells in the visual system, there is little
information about the particular cortical cell types that generate
these responses (Marr’s third level), and models that assign
function to particular cortical layers are still in early stages (Bas-
tos et al., 2012; Grossberg and Pearson, 2008). I will return later
to describe new approaches that may be powerful enough to
finally solve the problem of cortex. That said, one success of
the field deserves special emphasis: the demonstration (Perrett
et al., 1982; Quiroga et al., 2005) that there are neurons in the
high-level cortex that represent particular items (e.g., a particular
person) in an invariant way. These cells fire when a particular
item is seen, imagined, or remembered (Gelbard-Sagiv et al.,
2008; Kreiman et al., 2000). Such neurons can operate within
memory circuits to form associations (e.g., connecting a face
to a name) and within action selection circuits to connect a visual
stimulus to an action, as described in subsequent parts of this
Perspective.
Long-Term Episodic Memory
You may meet someone and know they are familiar; then a new
fact may suddenly allow you to remember their name and the
sequence of events when you met. Such recollection is termed
‘‘episodic memory.’’ Extensive studies of hippocampal lesions
in humans and animals (reviewed in Eichenbaum et al., 2007;
Squire and Wixted, 2011) have made it clear that the hippocam-
pus is necessary for episodic memory (Marr’s first level). In the
following sections, I will first describe the way memory recall is
organized and the neural code that is utilized (Marr’s second
level). I will then turn to what has been learned about the under-
lying network mechanisms (Marr’s third level).
Amajor advance in the study of memory has been the ability to
observe memory sequences being replayed in the rodent hippo-
campus. The breakthrough that made this possible was the dis-
covery of place cells (O’Keefe, 1976). These fire whenever a rat
enters a small subregion of the environment (the place field).
Different cells have place fields in different locations, thus collec-
tively mapping the environment. Once the location of a cell’s
place field is determined, the activity of that cell can be used
to determine when thememory of that location is being replayed,
even when a rat is elsewhere.
Experiments show that the hippocampus produces two
different forms of replay. One type is offline during rest or sleep
and can be identified by sharp-wave ripples (SWRs), an extracel-
lular (field potential) signal that lasts for100 ms and reflects the
average signal in nearby cells (Figure 4A). A key observation is868 Neuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.that, during an SWR, place cells often fire in the same sequence
as they did during the actual experience of a path (Figure 4A),
albeit sped up (103 time compressed) (Na´dasdy et al., 1999;
Wikenheiser and Redish, 2013; Wilson and McNaughton,
1994). Such sweeps are interpreted to mean that what is being
replayed is the memory of having traversed the path. Consistent
with this interpretation, such sweeps do not occur if synaptic
plasticity is blocked during the actual experience of the path (Du-
pret et al., 2010; D. Silva et al., 2012, Soc. Neurosci., confer-
ence). A further major advance was the demonstration that
such replay is functionally important. This was shown by evoking
inhibition whenever the beginning of an SWR was detected,
thereby blocking the remaining replay. It was found that this pro-
cedure compromised subsequent memory-guided behavior
(Girardeau et al., 2009; Jadhav et al., 2012). The replay that
occurs during SWRs is thought to have two functions. One is
synaptic consolidation, a process that stabilizes the synaptic
changes in the hippocampus that occurred during learning (Du-
dai, 2012). The other is systems consolidation. According to one
view of this process, what the hippocampus stores is an index
that points to more detailed memories in cortex (Teyler and
Rudy, 2007). Systems consolidation strengthens and reorga-
nizes these cortical representations (Diekelmann and Born,
2010; McClelland et al., 1995) (over many sleep periods), making
it eventually possible to recall substantial information without the
hippocampus (Tse et al., 2007).
A second type of memory replay occurs online—for instance,
when a rat pauses at the choice point of a maze and has to
decide which direction leads to reward (Johnson and Redish,
2007). During this pause, the replay is not accompanied by an
SWR but, rather, by theta and gamma oscillations (the theta-
gamma neural code is described later). What is observed at
the choice point is that the sequential positions along one arm
of the maze replay during one theta cycle (150 ms); moments
later, the experience down the other arm is replayed during
another theta cycle. These sequences are transferred to down-
stream structures (prefrontal cortex [PFC] and striatum) (Jones
and Wilson, 2005; Pennartz et al., 2011; Tort et al., 2008; van
der Meer and Redish, 2011) involved in making the decision
about which direction to turn toward (see the ‘‘Action Selection’’
section). Indeed, the strength of the theta frequency coupling be-
tween the hippocampus and striatum correlates with the accu-
racy of the ultimate decision (DeCoteau et al., 2007).
The communication of multi-part messages (e.g., the route to
a goal) from one brain region to another requires a neural code.
Such a code specifies two conventions, one about how the mul-
tiple items that make up a longer message are formatted and the
other about how items are represented. Consider the Morse
code: letters are represented by specific sequences of dots
and dashes. Formatting involves conventions about the duration
of pauses (brief pauses separate the dots/dashes that represent
letters; longer pauses separate letters).
In the hippocampus, there is now substantial evidence that
formatting is done by the co-occurring oscillations in the gamma
(30–100 Hz) and theta (4–10 Hz) ranges (Figure 4B) (Bragin
et al., 1995; Lisman and Buzsa´ki, 2008; O’Keefe and Recce,
1993), which together organize a theta-gamma code. Using
this code (Figure 4C), multi-item messages are formatted as
Figure 4. Network and Coding Mechanisms of the Hippocampus
(A) Memory replay during a single SWR in the field potential (bottom trace). Top plot shows the replay: action potentials (dots) in nine cells fire in the same order as
when the animal traversed the path. Cell number is ordered according the position of the cells’ place fields ( Wikenheiser and Redish, 2013, Figure 5).
(B) Theta and gamma oscillations in the extracellular field potential (extra; at top) and intracellular voltage (intra; at bottom) ( Penttonen et al., 1998, Figure 4C).
(C) The theta/gamma code: an item is represented by a subset of cells (black) in the network (oval) that fire during a gamma cycle; different items are represented
in different gamma cycles of a theta cycle. This raises the question of how a continuous world is discretized into items. According to one proposal, items become
defined at lower levels of the hierarchy by a combination of processes of perceptual learning, driven by input statistics, and behavioral learning dominated by the
individual ability of stimuli to predict reward/punishment (Verschure et al., 2003).
(D) Wiring diagram of excitatory connections in the hippocampus. Sensory information arrives from the lateral entorhinal and spatial information from the medial
entorhinal cortex. Convergence of these inputs onto dentate granules cells produces a conjunctive representation (rate remapping) (Lu et al., 2013; Renno´-Costa
et al., 2010). Information is passed from the dentate to CA3, which has the abundant recurrent connections characteristic of attractor networks. The attractor
produces pattern completion and error correction (Hasselmo et al., 1995; Treves and Rolls, 1992). Accurate recall of sequences (as in A) requires a chaining
process, in which one memory in the sequence triggers the next, and a process of error correction after each chaining step (Sompolinsky and Kanter, 1986).
According to one model, chaining is the result of backprojections from CA3 (and mossy cells) to granule cells (Lisman et al., 2005). After each chaining step, the
item is sent from dentate to CA3 for error correction, followed by the next chaining step. The function of CA1 is less clear, but recent work indicates that inputs
from the thalamus, cortex, and CA2 serve to differentiate CA1 response patterns that occur in the same location but at a different time or working memory state
(H.T. Ito et al., personal communication; Mankin et al., 2012; Wood et al., 2000).
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(an ensemble) that fires during a gamma cycle; an ordered
multi-item message is organized by representing different items
in the sequential gamma cycles within a theta cycle (for definitionof an item, see Figure 4C, legend). It was long suspected that en-
sembles could be represented by the cells synchronized to fire
within a gamma cycle (Engel and Singer, 2001). With the advent
of methods that allowed recordings from large numbers ofNeuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 869
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find two cells that code for the same place. In support of
the aforementioned code, these cells are synchronized to fire
within a time window roughly equal to a gamma cycle (Dragoi
and Buzsa´ki, 2006). Other experiments show that interfering
with theta or gamma oscillations produces memory deficits
(Carle´n et al., 2012; Korotkova et al., 2010; Robbe and Buzsa´ki,
2009; Shirvalkar et al., 2010).
The second aspect of coding is representation, and here too
there has been progress. So much work on the hippocampus
dealt with place information that it led to the impression that
the hippocampus only represented spatial information; so why
then do hippocampal lesions interfere with the memory of sen-
sory experience? Recent work resolved this problem by
showing that sensory experience is indeed represented, albeit
in an unusual way, termed ‘‘rate remapping.’’ Consider the
ensemble of several hundred CA3 place cells that fire when a
rat is in a given place (this is less than 1% of all CA3 cells). Ex-
periments show that alteration of the sensory environment
causes some of these cells to increase their rate and others to
decrease their rate (Komorowski et al., 2009; Leutgeb et al.,
2005). In this way, the sensory stimulus at a given place is en-
coded by the pattern of rates among the place cells that code
for that place. This special role of place in sensory coding
may be the basis of the Method of Loci, developed by the
Greeks to remember lists. According to this method, one should
form a visual image of each item and imagine each image in
sequential positions along a well-known path. To recall the
list, one imagines taking the path and visualizes the items
placed there (reviewed in Foer, 2011). This method may work
because rate remapping encodes item information in place cells
and because there are pre-existing connections that link place
cells representing sequential position.
Network Mechanisms of Long-Term Memory
The intricate set of connections that define the wiring diagram of
the hippocampus (Figure 4D) fascinated Marr (1971), and he
attempted to relate aspects of the CA3 network to memory func-
tion (Marr’s third level), specifically the fact thatCA3neuronshave
abundant recurrent synaptic connections by which they excite
other CA3 cells. Notably, such connections are the defining
feature of the attractor networks that theorists have postulated
to underliememory storage (Hopfield, 1982).The following simpli-
fied example illustrates how these synapses might store the
association between a face and a name. Suppose that cell 1 rep-
resents Sue’s face and cell 4 represents her name (Figure 1C).
When you first met Sue and heard her name, both cells fired. As
proposed by Hebb (1949) and then verified experimentally (Kelso
et al., 1986), hippocampal synapses undergo long-term potenti-
ation (LTP) when there is simultaneous presynaptic and postsyn-
aptic firing. Because this is true for the synapses connecting cells
1 and 4, these synapses will be strengthened (the postsynaptic
excitation produced by a presynaptic action potential becomes
larger). Now suppose that sometime later you see Sue, leading
to activation of cell 1. Cell 4 will be caused to fire because of
the strengthened input from cell 1, thereby bringing Sue’s name
to mind. This is termed ‘‘pattern completion’’ because activating
part of the association (face) leads to activation of (attraction to)
the complete memory (face plus name).870 Neuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.The concept of CA3 as an attractor has been tested in several
ways. In one study, the NMDA receptors (NMDARs) necessary for
LTP (Bliss andCollingridge, 1993) were genetically deleted in CA3
(Nakazawa et al., 2002). These mice were presented with a frag-
ment of the cue by which the animal had been conditioned to
make a particular behavioral response. In wild-type animals, this
partial cue was sufficient to evoke the conditioned response; in
the mice lacking CA3 NMDARs, it was not. This indicates that
the crucial process of pattern completion is dependent on the
proper function of CA3. In another type of experiment, recordings
were used to directly observe the ‘‘attraction’’ process. In these
experiments, rats first formed memories of a chamber, the walls
of which were frequently morphed between a square or round
configuration (Leutgeb et al., 2007), producingmemories of these
shapes. In the crucial experiments, the walls were morphed to a
shape that was basically square but slightly round. This altered
the firing pattern in the input region of the hippocampus (the
dentate gyrus) away from that characteristic of the square envi-
ronment. In contrast, CA3 cells, which are downstream from
the dentate gyrus, fired in a manner similar to that in the square
environment, as expected if the recurrent connections of CA3 at-
tracted the activity back to a stored memory (Renno´-Costa et al.,
2014; see also Neunuebel and Knierim, 2014).
The aforementioned results make the strong case that the
memory of an environment (an item) is stored in the synapses
of CA3. However, to produce the replay of sequences of items
(Figure 4A), there must also be synaptic processes that link
one item to the next. The synapses that store such linkages
are not known, but one possibility is the feedback connections
from the CA3/mossy cells to the dentate gyrus (for an explana-
tion, see Figure 4D, legend).
Given the occurrence of place fields in the hippocampus, it has
been of great interest to determine the network operations that
enable the spatial sense to be computed. One underlying algo-
rithm for how an animal can determine its location in an environ-
ment is called ‘‘path integration,’’ a process that depends on
integrating a velocity signal (this process is what helps you find
the bathroom in the dark). Velocity can be derived from the
vestibular system, from optic flow, and from the motor system
(howmany steps have been taken) (Calton et al., 2003; Dombeck
et al., 2010; Jamali et al., 2009; Ravassard et al., 2013; Stackman
et al., 2002; Terrazas et al., 2005). Current ideas about the
network mechanism of integration are best understood by
considering a simplified one-dimensional integrator network in
which cells are arranged along a line (Figure 1D). Each cell ex-
cites local cells and inhibits more distant ones (Skaggs et al.,
1995; Zhang, 1996). The local excitation produces local self-sus-
taining activity (termed a ‘‘bump’’). Special synaptic inputs move
the bump’s position in the network and do so in proportion to ve-
locity; this integration allows the position of the bump to repre-
sent the computed position of the animal in the environment. A
type of cell in the entorhinal cortex (grid cells) is thought to
work analogously to represent position in two dimensions (Burak
and Fiete, 2009), thereby forming a cognitive map.
A recent paper (Erdem and Hasselmo, 2012) proposes an al-
gorithm for how rats can use such a map to find a shortcut to a
reward site (Tolman et al., 1992). An artificial velocity signal hav-
ing a particular direction is put into the integrator. This moves the
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the vector. Vectors of different directions away from the cur-
rent position are chosen sequentially; if a particular vector
produces movement of the bump through the reward site, the
direction of that vector is a good shortcut. This algorithm is
an interesting example of how a cognitive function might
be reduced to a defined set of neurally plausible operations
(for an alternative algorithm, see M. Sanchez Fibla et al., 2010,
IEEE/RSJ, conference).
Although we now have information about where memories are
stored and how they are replayed, we know much less about the
events that encode a memory and make it endure. Recent work
suggests that the hippocampus, like a computer memory, has
separate read/write modes (De Almeida et al., 2012) and that
the flow of information is different in these modes (Colgin et al.,
2009). Presumably, processes during the write mode account
for the observed changes in hippocampal synapses during
learning (Whitlock et al., 2006). However, there are not yet real-
time methods for observing encoding, so we know little about
what type of activity patterns actually produce synaptic modifica-
tion. We also know relatively little about what makes some mem-
ories fade while others endure. Recent work is beginning to shed
light on relevant factors. This work shows thatmotivation, novelty,
and reward influence dopamine release, which acts to convert
early LTP into a more permanent synaptic modification (Bethus
et al., 2010; Hasselmo and Schnell, 1994; Lisman et al., 2011; Ya-
gishita et al., 2014). Understanding these factorsmay have impor-
tant implications for educational methods (Ballarini et al., 2013).
In summary, many of the core problems in episodic memory
have been directly addressed (for reviews, see Buzsa´ki and
Moser, 2013; Kandel et al., 2014). Notably, the concept of a
memory ensemble has been verified (Liu et al., 2012), and the
neural code used by the hippocampus has been characterized.
The replay of memory sequences has been directly observed
and the role of this replay in behavioral memory has been estab-
lished. Furthermore, there are strong hypotheses about how
particular cell types and network connections produce function,
and some of these have been experimentally tested. Taken
together, this is substantial progress by Marr’s criteria.
Short-Term Memory
The brain has special mechanisms for storing short-term mem-
ories (STMs) on the timescale of seconds (Baddeley, 2012).
This is evident from the fact that, whereas the capacity of long-
term memory (LTM) is enormous, the capacity (span) of STM is
remarkably limited (for a review, see Luck and Vogel, 2013).
For instance, the span for digits is only approximately seven
items, making it relatively easy to remember a seven-digit phone
number but difficult to remember a longer list. The determinants
of span are important to understand because span is a major
determinant of intelligence, as estimated using standard intelli-
gence tests (Fukuda et al., 2010). Furthermore, keeping informa-
tion persistently present (e.g., information about a selected goal)
may be important in influencing action selection (this is ‘‘working
memory,’’ a term often used synonymously with STM).
Addressing Marr’s second level are experiments that have
sought to determine the general strategy for encoding working
memory. A major discovery was the finding of neurons that firepersistently during working memory tasks (Fuster and Alex-
ander, 1971). In a particularly informative set of experiments,
animals were trained to remember the location of a briefly pre-
sented visual object for several seconds (the delay period) and
then make a saccade to that location (Funahashi et al., 1989).
A population of cells in the PFC fired during the entire delay
period. Significantly, the particular cells that fired depended on
the location of the object (e.g., left or right part of the screen)
and could thus serve as a storage mechanism for the impending
action. These results suggest that, whereas LTM is stored by
synaptic modification, STM is stored by persistent firing.
Addressing Marr’s third level, there have been efforts to deter-
mine the mechanism of persistent firing. One possibility is that it
arises from a network configuration in which cells, once
activated by an external stimulus, persist in firing because they
synaptically excite each other (reverberation). Theoretical and
experimental work suggested that the depolarizing current
through NMDA channels could have a critical role in this mutual
excitation (Lisman et al., 1998; Major et al., 2008; Palmer et al.,
2014). Notably, because the mutual excitation among excited
cells depends only on the voltage-dependent properties of
NMDA channels (rather than selective connectivity), such net-
works can support the STM of even novel items. Recent exper-
iments directly support this mechanism: an NMDAR antagonist
prevents persistent firing in the PFC in vivo and compromises
STM (Wang et al., 2013). Still, it is unclear whether all forms of
STM are encoded by persistent activity, and recent experiments
have raised doubts (Liu et al., 2014). It remains possible that
some forms of STM are stored by short-term potentiation
(STP), an associative synaptic strengthening that is more short
lived that LTP but more easily induced (Erickson et al., 2010;
Sanderson et al., 2009; Sugase Miyamoto et al., 2008).
What determines the capacity limit of STM?One possibility is a
multiplexing process by which the same network keeps multiple
items active but at different phases of an oscillation. A specific
form of multiplexing based on a theta-gamma code (Lisman
and Idiart, 1995) (Lisman and Buzsa´ki, 2008) suggests that ca-
pacity is determined by the number of gamma cycles within a
theta cycle (Figure 4C). Some experiments point in this direction
(De Almeida et al., 2012; Siegel et al., 2009), but strong support
has not yet been obtained.
Testing this and other models of STM in humans has been
complicated by uncertainty about the location of STM buffers.
The particular cortical region involved depends on the type of in-
formation stored (Emrich et al., 2013; Harrison and Tong, 2009).
STM for digits and visual patterns involves regions in the parietal
lobe (Cave and Squire, 1992; Koenigs et al., 2011). However, it
does not follow that STM is stored in a single region. Recent ad-
vances in high-resolution fMRI have shown that early sensory
areas show an activity pattern during the delay period that re-
flects the particular stimulus stored in STM (Harrison and Tong,
2009). Complicating the picture further is that the information
may be independently stored in different networks using
different representations. Notably, the parahippocampal region
contains an episodic memory buffer, one function of which is
to load STM information into hippocampal LTM stores (Badde-
ley, 2000; Schon et al., 2005, 2015). In contrast to other STM
buffers that use a phonetic representation (based on sounds),Neuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 871
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In summary, byMarr’s standard, the understanding of STM re-
mains at a fairly early stage. It seems likely that some forms of
STM require persistent firing caused by reverberation, but the
specific network connections responsible for reverberation
have not been identified. The basis of span, a key property of
STM, remains to be determined.
Action Selection
We now turn to the problem of how actions are selected. As
described in the section on vision, there are neurons high in
the cortical hierarchy that can represent a sensory item in an
invariant way. In the action selection process, such ‘‘sensory’’
cells become more strongly connected to cells that select par-
ticular actions. Remarkable progress has been made in under-
standing how and where this occurs, using the two major lab-
oratory models of action selection: classical (Pavlovian) and
instrumental conditioning (reviewed in van der Meer et al., 2012).
Mechanisms of Pavlovian Conditioning
An extensively studied example of Pavlovian conditioning in-
volves the emotion of fear. Rats show fear by freezing, for
instance, after being given a shock (the unconditioned stimulus).
Normally, a moderate intensity tone does not produce fear; how-
ever, if a shock is given whenever the tone is given, the tone be-
comes a cue (the conditioned stimulus). Once this happens, the
cue given alone will produce freezing.
The core problem in fear conditioning is determining where
and how the tone signal becomes able to evoke fear. Experi-
ments show that this occurs in the pyramidal cells of the lateral
nucleus of the amygdala. These cells are hardwired so that
when they are excited by painful stimuli, they activate cells in
the hypothalamus and central gray (Figure 3B) that produce
freezing and other components of the emotional response (for
reviews, see Johansen et al., 2011; Lang and Davis, 2006).
The cells of the lateral nucleus also receive inputs that carry in-
formation about the tone that, before conditioning, are too
weak to excite the cell. During conditioning, the shock results
in strong depolarization of these cells. This, together with the
glutamate released as result of the tone, activates NMDARs,
which, in turn, produces LTP of the synapses that carry tone in-
formation. Once this potentiation occurs, the tone alone can
activate the pyramidal cells and produce a fear response (Quirk
et al., 1995). A method that specifically blocks LTP in these
cells prevents fear conditioning (Rumpel et al., 2005). Further-
more, a synaptic stimulation procedure that weakens the
potentiated synapses erases the fear response (Nabavi et al.,
2014). What appears to be a key event in associating tone
with shock is the depolarization of the pyramidal cells by the
synaptic inputs that carry information about the shock. It is
this depolarization that is necessary for the LTP of the synapse
that carries tone information. It follows that, if tones and opto-
genetically produced depolarization were paired, it should be
possible to make an animal fearful of a tone without ever
shocking it. Experiments show that this is possible (Johansen
et al., 2010). Thus, an important form of Pavlovian conditioning
can be explained in terms of specific synaptic changes in an
identified cell type.872 Neuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Mechanisms of Instrumental Conditioning
Whereas fear conditioning involves a hardwired component of
behavior (e.g., the fear evoked by shock), instrumental condi-
tioning does not. With instrumental conditioning by reward or
aversive stimuli, almost any form of behavior can be produced.
As an example, consider a rat being conditioned to make a right
turn at the choice point of a maze. Under these conditions, the
cue is the sensory properties of the choice point. If a reward is
consistently given immediately after the animal happens to
make a right turn, the animal will eventually make right turns
consistently. Alternatively, rats can be made to avoid taking a
right turn if they are shocked whenever they do so. Over the an-
imal’s life, various forms of behavior have been chosen, leading
to reward and punishment. The action selection system takes
this cumulative experience into consideration when actions are
selected (Marr’s first level). As described in the following para-
graphs, we now know a great deal about the underlying pro-
cesses and how they are implemented at the network and
cellular levels. The algorithm involved depends on a parallel
comparison of different possible actions and has partially sepa-
rate subsystems for storing the cumulative associations of
reward and punishments.
Experiments suggest that the synaptic changes that produce
instrumental conditioning are at the synapses that carry the
cue from sensory cortex to the medium spiny neurons (MSNs)
of the striatum, the input structure of the basal ganglia. These
synaptic changes are controlled by dopamine, which acts as a
teacher to signal whether reward or punishment has occurred.
The understanding of these dopaminergic mechanisms has
come from progress in two fields. In vivo recordings showed
that unexpected rewards (positive reinforcement) produce a
burst of firing in the dopamine cells that innervate the striatum
(Cohen et al., 2012; Schultz et al., 1997). Meanwhile, experi-
ments on striatal slices (Shen et al., 2008) showed that dopamine
elevation increases the strength of active synapses onto a sub-
set of MSNs that have D1 dopamine receptors and are part of
what is called the ‘‘direct’’ pathway that promotes action (the
Go pathway in Figure 5) (see also Yagishita et al., 2014). Accord-
ing to a prominent computational framework (Frank, 2005;
Collins and Frank, 2014), these D1-MSNs (and their downstream
targets in the globus pallidus, thalamus, and premotor cortex)
are organized into parallel streams that promote different actions
(e.g., RIGHT or LEFT) (Cisek and Kalaska, 2010; Frank et al.,
2004; Houk andWise, 1995; Kelly and Strick, 2004). Thus, if, dur-
ing the initial stages of conditioning, cortical synapses activate
the RIGHT D1-MSNs (perhaps by chance) and this leads to
reward, these synapseswill be strengthened. As a result, on sub-
sequent trials, the same cue will more strongly excite the RIGHT
D1-MSNs and will lead, by the direct pathway, to increased
probability of the animal taking a RIGHT turn.
This framework has now been tested in several different ways.
Inactivation of the striatum (Miyachi et al., 1997)—or, more spe-
cifically, D1-MSN cells (Hikida et al., 2010)—prevents reward-
dependent conditioning. Conversely, optogenetic activation of
these cells promotes action initiation (Kravitz et al., 2010). Most
remarkable are experiments confirming the role of dopamine in
conditioning. These experiments show that preventing burst-
mediated release of dopamine prevents conditioning (Zweifel
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Figure 5. Connections of the Basal Ganglia
and Premotor Cortex that Mediate
Instrumental Conditioning
The sensory cortex carries cue information to
the striatum through synapses onto MSNs.
There are different MSNs for different actions
(e.g., LEFT or RIGHT; L or R), and these form
separate streams related to different actions in
the downstream globus pallidus externa (GPe),
GPi, thalamus, and premotor cortex. Some
MSNs have D1 receptors and form the direct
pathway to the output structures of the basal
ganglia, the GPi and SNr, both of which are
spontaneously active (Hikosaka, 2007) and
reduce activity in premotor cortex via a
thalamic intermediary (Goldberg et al., 2012).
Reward, via dopamine elevation from the
substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc), leads to
LTP of cortical inputs to the D1-MSN that led
to the rewarded action. This change promotes
the rewarded action on subsequent trials by
the following mechanism: the strengthened
input to the direct pathway inhibits GPi/SNr,
thereby removing a negative bias from pre-
motor cortex and allowing action selection by a
winner-take-all process in that structure (Cisek
and Kalaska, 2010). Aversive stimulation, via a
decrease in dopamine, leads to LTP on the
D2-MSN cells that represent the chosen ac-
tion. These cells, via the indirect pathway (with
GPe as an intermediary), increase the inhibitory
output of the basal ganglia, making the chosen
action less likely. Connections from premotor
cortex to striatum (dashed green lines) may
selectively enable the possible actions in the
current context (i.e., L and R). Furthermore, after the action is finally chosen in premotor cortex and then executed, ‘‘chosen action’’ activity in this
pathway (Lau and Glimcher, 2008) can ensure that credit is correctly assigned to the chosen action (Fee, 2012).
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can produce conditioning (Figure 6), obviating the need for
actual reward (Adamantidis et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2012).
What has described earlier is reinforcement by reward, but
conditioning can also be produced by aversive stimuli (punish-
ment or omission of expected reward). Reinforcement using
aversive stimuli leads to synaptic strengthening in a second
type of MSNs, which contain D2 receptors and are part of the
indirect pathway, a pathway that inhibits actions (the No Go
pathway in Figure 5). Again, the study of dopamine cells
and plasticity mechanisms clarified the teaching mechanism.
Whereas unexpected rewards increase the firing of dopami-
nergic cells, aversive stimuli decrease dopamine by inhibiting
the spontaneous firing of dopaminergic neurons (reward predic-
tion error) (Schultz et al., 1997). Experiments in the slice prepara-
tion indicate that a decrease of dopamine enhances LTP onto
D2-MSNs (Shen et al., 2008). The stronger excitation of these
cells will, by the indirect pathway (Figure 5, legend), make it
less likely that the punished action will be repeated.
This model of conditioning by aversive stimuli has been
tested in several ways. Consistent with this model, inactivation
of D2-MSNs of the indirect pathway interferes with the ability of
aversive stimuli to produce conditioning but has no effect on the
ability of reward to produce conditioning (Hikida et al., 2010).
Furthermore, optogenetic stimulation of these cells produces
a Parkinson’s-like state in which action initiation is reduced
(Kravitz et al., 2010). Finally, optogenetic methods that tran-
siently reduce dopamine release can be used to make animalsavoid the region where dopamine reduction occurs (Tan et al.,
2012).
Overall, this basal ganglia/premotor system provides a voting
process for action selection that depends on the history of
conditioning (both LEFT and RIGHT actions may have been re-
warded or punished to varying extents in the past). When a
cue is encountered, it is thus likely to lead to activation of
MSNs in both the direct (votes for) and indirect (votes against)
pathways and to do so for both LEFT and RIGHT actions (Cui
et al., 2013). The strength of these synapses, which depends
on the history of conditioning, determines the number of votes
(for or against) for LEFT/RIGHT actions. These votes are
funneled from MSNs to the basal ganglia output structure, the
GPi/SNr (globus pallidus interna/substantia nigra pars reticulata)
(Hikosaka, 2007), from there to the thalamus (Goldberg et al.,
2012), and finally to the premotor cortex (and, in some cases,
to the superior colliculus). It is there where votes for and against
are tallied and the final winner-take-all decision for LEFT or
RIGHT action is made (for a review, see Cisek and Kalaska,
2010). An important feature of this mode of basal ganglia func-
tion is that action selection is achieved by a fast parallel voting
process that reflects the entire history of previous conditioning.
Much less is known about a more deliberative mode in which
the basal ganglia chooses actions based on the serial recall of
episodicmemories from the hippocampus (Johnson andRedish,
2007).
The aforementioned framework for action selection helps to
explain several consequences of basal ganglia function (BelinNeuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 873
Figure 6. Conditioning by Optogenetic Activation of Dopamine Cells
instead of Actual Reward
Channel-rhodopsin was expressed in dopamine cells. When the mouse made
a ‘‘correct’’ response (in this case, a left nose poke), a flash of light was given to
activate channel-rhodopsin. Over days, the mouse showed conditioning by
makingmore pokes to the left (thick line), with little change of pokes to the right
(thin line). This conditioning underwent extinction when flashes were no longer
given after day 9. From the study of Kim et al. (2012), as supplied by E.S.
Boyden.
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addiction; addictive drugs lead to dopamine release (Hyman
et al., 2006), thereby strengthening the ‘‘chosen action’’ that pro-
duced dopamine release (the taking of the drug). This makes it
more and more likely that drug taking will be repeated in the
future (Redish, 2004). Another consequence is that D2 agonists
often turn patients into pathological gamblers (Lader, 2008).
The aforementioned model suggests why. Gambling losses
decrease dopamine, but this is not detected when the D2 recep-
tors are occupied by agonist. Thus, the normal strengthening of
the indirect pathway by losses, which depends on detection of a
dopamine decrease, does not occur. In contrast, wins are regis-
tered when the resulting increase in dopamine strengthens the
direct pathway by D1 action. The final result is that gambling be-
comes extraordinarily desirable because wins can affect the
voting process, whereas losses cannot.
In summary, substantial progress has been made in under-
standing instrumental conditioning at all three of Marr’s levels.
Notably, in current models, the synaptic sites that store the re-
sults of conditioning and the network mechanism by which this
information is used to select an action are specified. The proper-
ties of basal ganglia networks have been incorporated into large-
scale computer simulations, and these successfully account for
many aspects of conditioning (Eliasmith et al., 2012; Frank et al.,
2004; Grossberg, 2014; Gurney et al., 2004). Still, because much
remains to be learned about these networks, themodels are best
considered strong working hypotheses. For instance, it will be
important to verify in vivo that the key site of learning is at the
MSNs. There also remain important aspects of action selection
that are not well understood. For instance, dopamine, in addition
to affecting synaptic plasticity, also affects the excitability of
striatal cells, a modulation that may control the level of effort874 Neuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.that an organism is willing to make (Dagher and Robbins,
2009; Niv et al., 2007). Furthermore, themechanisms that enable
dopamine cells to be a good teacher are just beginning to be
elucidated (Lammel et al., 2012; Volman et al., 2013). As might
be expected for such a crucial process, the complexity of control
is high; the habenula, a structure that controls the dopamine sys-
tem and that has been strongly implicated in depression, has no
less than 15 subnuclei (Proulx et al., 2014). Finally, the picture
that emerges from the aforementioned work is that learning oc-
curs by trial and error; a behavioral variant is strengthened or
weakened depending on the results. However, this raises the
important question of what produces variation. In evolution,
this is due to mutation, but what produces variation in the brain?
In the study of birdsong, a clear answer has been obtained: there
is a specific cortical region, the function of which is to produce
variation (Aronov et al., 2008; Stepanek and Doupe, 2010). The
generality of this finding remains to be determined.
The Motor System
Once an action is selected, the motor system must execute the
action, and this is no trivial matter. Our motor abilities are exqui-
site. You can easily make a reach to a visible target, regardless of
whether your gaze is directed toward the target or whether the
target is only in your peripheral vision. More remarkably, you
can touch your ear lobe quite accurately even though you can’t
see it. This is possible regardless of both the particular trajectory
chosen and the load on your muscles (try touching your ear lobe
while holding amug in the same hand). What algorithm could un-
derlie this robust motor control? At present, we have only a very
limited answer to this question.
As noted earlier, we can reach a target that we gaze at directly
or one that is only in our peripheral vision. Given that information
about gaze angle is available to the brain, visual information
could be corrected for gaze angle. Indeed, recordings in the
parietal lobe indicate that such correction is done; objects are
represented in a coordinate system in which the position of an
object is defined relative to the body and does not depend on
gaze angle (Andersen and Mountcastle, 1983). Biologically plau-
sible network operations that can produce such a coordinate
transformation have been suggested (Andersen and Mountcas-
tle, 1983; Salinas and Sejnowski, 2001). More difficult to imagine
is how one can reach one’s ear lobe without visual guidance.
This requires knowledge of the position of the target and the po-
sition of the limbs. It has only recently become clear that there is
indeed a population code that represents hand position (Haus-
child et al., 2012), but surprisingly little is known about the mus-
cle and joint signals that allow this computation to be made
(Weber et al., 2011).
Once the coordinate system for specifying a reach is estab-
lished, the muscles needed to produce the reach must be
triggered by activity in the primary motor cortex. Despite consid-
erable effort, there remains no consensus about what motor cor-
tex is specifying about the reach. It remains unclear whether cells
represent a signal for muscle force, the direction of movement,
or a more abstract end goal of muscle action (Adelsberger
et al., 2014; Georgopoulos et al., 1982; Graziano, 2006; Shenoy
et al., 2013). One promising line of work suggests that subre-
gions of the motor cortex regulate groups of muscles that act
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ments that can be combined in various proportions to produce
a variety of actions) (Dominici et al., 2011; Overduin et al., 2012).
Any explanation of movement will have to specify not only
which muscles are activated but also how their activation is pre-
cisely timed. The cerebellum appears critical for a range of timing
processes that occur in the range of seconds (Manto et al.,
2012). One of these is the generation of temporal waveforms
that predict the sensory and somatosensory consequences of
one’s own motor commands (forward models), predictions that
are vital for motor and sensory processes (Bell et al., 2008;
Franklin andWolpert, 2011). Eye blink conditioning has provided
important insights into another timing function of the cerebellum.
In such conditioning, a tone is turned on and a puff of air is given
to the eye hundreds of milliseconds later. After such condition-
ing, the tone produces a protective eye blink just before the air
puff (reviewed in Thompson, 2005). Experiments show that, after
conditioning, the spontaneous firing of the output cells of the
cerebellar cortex, the Purkinje cells, pauses just before the air
puff (Jirenhed et al., 2007). Recent optogenetic experiments
demonstrate that such pauses are sufficient to trigger motor ac-
tion (Heiney et al., 2014). It remains controversial whether the
pause is due to reduced excitation (Ito, 2005) or increased inhi-
bition (Gao et al., 2012; Hirano and Kawaguchi, 2014; Schone-
wille et al., 2011; Welsh et al., 2005). Given the power that can
now be brought to bear on elucidating the cellular basis of timing
operations in the cerebellum, it seems likely that a clear under-
standing of cerebellar function will be forthcoming.
Although progress has been made in understanding some as-
pects of motor control, an overall view of how the system works
is lacking, and the field is very far from satisfying Marr’s criteria.
Advances are needed in understanding how cortex, basal
ganglia, and cerebellum function together (for one possibility,
see Shadmehr and Krakauer, 2008). One would hope that overall
design principles could be elucidated. One suggestion is that
motor control is organized by an 10-Hz clock (Llinas, 2002).
Consistent with this, the limit on independent finger movements
(such as in typing) is about 10 Hz (http://10fastfingers.com/
typing-test/english/top50). Indeed, if the motor system is
controlled by oscillations, actions longer than 100 ms must be
fundamentally discontinuous. Support for such discontinuity
comes frommeasurements of finger position during simple linear
movements (Vallbo andWessberg, 1993). Remarkably, there are
pulses of acceleration every 100 ms, suggesting that even
linear movement has a 10-Hz discretization. This rhythmicity is
coherent with signals in the cerebellum and motor cortex (Gross
et al., 2002), consistent with the idea that the entiremotor system
is organized by a 10-Hz clock. Most persuasively, movement
onset occurs at a preferred phase of ongoing cortical oscillations
(Drewes and VanRullen, 2011; Igarashi et al., 2013). Thus, it
seems likely that elucidating the role of oscillations in the motor
system will be an important step toward understanding the still-
mysterious algorithms of motor control.
Higher Mental Functions
From the discussion thus far, one can see in rough outline how a
‘‘simple’’ behavior might occur, but what about more complex
mental functions, such as executive control, thought, and con-sciousness? Here, I outline very briefly current efforts to under-
stand these higher functions.
Executive Control
Action selection in the laboratory setting involves linking a sensory
cue to an action but does not generally involve context. Action
selection in real-life situations takes an enormous amount of
contextual information into consideration, including the existence
of prepotent responses (Schall and Godlove, 2012); the assess-
ment of what is possible (affordances) given the current goals (Ci-
sek, 2007; Gibson, 1977); the application of abstract rules (Wallis
et al., 2001); and the evaluation of potential reward based on their
magnitude (Madlon-Kay et al., 2013), delay (Ballard and Knutson,
2009), and uncertainty (Kepecs et al., 2008). This strong depen-
dence on multiple constraints is not unlike the dependence of
recognition on context (Figure 2); thus, it is likely to depend on
the hierarchical properties of the cortical regions that control ac-
tion (Cooper and Shallice, 2000). The basal ganglia is also hierar-
chically organized (Haber andCalzavara, 2009; Yin andKnowlton,
2006); conceptual breakthroughs are needed to understand how
these interacting hierarchies produce executive control.
Language-Based Control
The existence of language raises questions about the generality
of the mechanisms of action selection revealed by the study of
instrumental condition. Whereas animals have to be conditioned
by the experimenter to make a particular action, a human can
simply be asked (e.g., ‘‘please raise your hand’’). One wonders
whether some entirely new mechanism of action selection has
evolved in humans or whether, as suggested in a recent paper
(Kriete et al., 2013), modification of existing basal ganglia mech-
anisms has made action selection dependent on thought rather
than conditioning.
Consciousness
According to dualists, consciousness cannot be explained in
terms of the physical properties of the brain. By contrast, neu-
roscience now assumes that consciousness is a result of
specific properties of brain networks (Dehaene and Changeux,
2011; Edelman et al., 2011; Koch, 2004). Studying conscious-
ness is not easy, but there are methods. Reportability is the
standard experimental method for verifying human conscious-
ness. Based on experiments that manipulate the ability of sub-
jects to report visual stimuli, Dehaene and Changeux (2011)
proposed that the sensory cortex does local visual processing
before information comes to consciousness. Then, at some crit-
ical juncture, information becomes widely communicated from
the local source to a global neuronal workspace, thereby pro-
ducing consciousness. What might the critical juncture be?
There is some evidence that this occurs when a high-level
cortical model is chosen that correctly predicts low-level sen-
sory information (Graboi and Lisman, 2003; Pascual-Leone
and Walsh, 2001; Pollen, 1999). A further issue is how informa-
tion is communicated to the global neuronal workspace. It is
well known that there are direct connections between cortical
regions but (Sherman, 2005) emphasizes that there is also a
thalamic route. Thus, the thalamus, which could provide atten-
tional control of communication (Crick, 1984; Halassa et al.,
2014; Saalmann et al., 2012; Schmid et al., 2012; Zikopoulos
and Barbas, 2006), must be considered a potential route to
the global neuronal workspace.Neuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 875
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from consideration of unconscious action (Lisman and Sternberg,
2013). A person can drive to work along a habitual route and also
think about a problem. Upon arrival at work, the person may
remember how they solved the problem but may be unable to
report anything about the commute, thus indicating that driving
was done unconsciously by habit. Relating such actions to habit
opens newways to explore the unconscious because habit (auto-
matic) and non-habit (goal-directed) behaviors can be distin-
guished in rodents (Dickinson, 1985), and experiments show
that different brain regions are involved (Daw et al., 2005; Smith
et al., 2012;Yin andKnowlton, 2006). Therefore, itmaybepossible
to identify mechanisms unique to the regions that mediate non-
habit behaviors, thereby providing clues about the mechanism
of consciousness. One possible mechanism deserves special
mention because of recent progress. The philosopher John Locke
defined consciousness as ‘‘the perception of what passes in a
man’s ownmind’’ (Locke, 1689), implying that consciousness de-
pends on a brain architecture in which thought can activate
perceptual processes (e.g., imagery or auditory sensation). In a
recent experiment, such activation was demonstrated directly
(Albers et al., 2013; see also Shergill et al., 2002). Subjects were
shown oriented bars and were asked to imagine the bars rotated
by a certain amount; using fMRI, it was found that the activation
pattern in the visual cortexwas similar to that producedby viewing
rotated bars. If Locke’s definition of consciousness is correct, un-
derstanding the top-down information flow that produces imagery
will provide a mechanistic description of consciousness.
Conclusions
Let us return to the central question of this Perspective: where
are we in the historical process of understanding the brain?
There are major successes to point to that meet Marr’s three
criteria for understanding. Through the study of the hippocampal
system, it is now possible to directly observe memory se-
quences being recalled and to optogenetically manipulate mem-
ories. Furthermore, specific networks and synaptic connections
have been demonstrated to form the associations that underlie
some forms of memory. In the case of action selection, the syn-
apses in the amygdala and basal ganglia where conditioning oc-
curs have been identified. The understanding of Pavlovian and
instrumental conditioning is not superficial; the fact that optoge-
netic stimulation of specific cells can altogether bypass the need
for the unconditioned stimulus demonstrates that core pro-
cesses are now understood. Current models of the hippocam-
pus, amygdala, and basal ganglia are certainly incomplete, but
they are unlikely to be fundamentally wrong.
Less progress has beenmade in understanding visual percep-
tion, working memory, and motor control. We cannot yet under-
stand these processes because they are cortical and the role of
different cortical layers and cell types has not yet been deter-
mined. It was thought that the canonical flow of information
within a cortical column was from layer 4 to layers 2/3, to layers
5/6 (Douglas andMartin, 2007), but it now seems likely that this is
not generally the case (Constantinople and Bruno, 2013). There
are, however, reasons to be optimistic about prospects for un-
derstanding the cortex. Experimental methods of enormous po-
wer are now being brought to bear on the problem. For example,876 Neuron 86, May 20, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.in the somatosensory cortex, it is now possible to study the func-
tion of identified cell types in awake animals during sensory-
guided decisions (Larkum, 2013; Xu et al., 2012). Furthermore,
during such decisions, it is possible to inhibit or excite specific
cell types using optogenetics (Guo et al., 2014). These new
methods would seem to be sufficiently powerful to finally crack
the cortex problem.
To be sure, the sheer number of cytoarchitectonic areas in cor-
tex (Figure 3A) makes the prospect of understanding this part of
the brain seem daunting. There are, however, regularities that
may simplify the task. Different regions have similar cell types
with common connection motifs (Klausberger and Somogyi,
2008; Pi et al., 2013). Furthermore, there are repeating rules for
hierarchical organization: most of the cortex is accounted for
by five paired cortical hierarchies arising from primitive regions
(Pandya and Yeterian, 1985; Figure 3, legend). Similarly, the
study of subcortical structures has identified repeating structural
rules (Kinkhabwala et al., 2011; Swanson, 2005).
The skeptic might pose another ground for pessimism: that
what we are learning about the rodent brain, the workhorse of
modern neuroscience, may not apply to the human brain. This
seems unlikely, given the qualitative similarities of rodent and hu-
man neuroanatomy. However, there are data in one research
area that bears on this question. Recordings from the human hip-
pocampal regionmade during surgery reveal place cells and grid
cells with obvious similarity to those recorded in the rodent (Ek-
strom et al., 2003; Jacobs et al., 2013). Thus, even though there
are certainly differences between the human brain and rodent
brain, there is little doubt that what is learned from the study of
the rodent brain will take us a long way toward understanding
the human brain.
Perhaps 20 years ago, one could have argued that the emer-
gence of cognitive function from interconnected neurons was
deeply mysterious. That does not seem true today. What has
changed is that we now have a feel for how networks can pro-
duce cognitively relevant computations (Figures 1, 4, and 5). In
many areas of brain research, models of network function are
now being explored through the interplay of experimentation,
theory, and computer modeling. This is leading to sound, tested
concepts that addressMarr’s three levels. In summary, there has
been demonstrated success in providing an understanding of
several brain processes, and there is every reason to expect
further rapid progress. Thus, history is likely to look back on
the first half of the 21st century as the period during which the
brain came to be understood.
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